

ing mind, at whose will and by whose power and wisdom they have been effectuated. We have never seen a whole nature ordered into being—and which therefore in its entireness and totality may be denominated to us a singular effect—just as on the first sight of a watch, the watch regarded as a whole is to us a singular effect. But neither with the one nor the other is there any singularity in the essential consequent. The singularity lies only in certain circumstantials which have properly no part in the reasoning, and which for the proof of an antecedent wisdom in either case may be dismissed from the sequences altogether. In that which the mind strictly bears regard to in this argument there is no singularity. We have seen a multitude of times over that which is in the watch, accommodation of parts to a desirable end—and whenever we had the opportunity of perceiving also the antecedent term, there was uniformly the mind of one who devised and purposed the end—and so, on the principle which gives truth to all our reasoning from experience, we infer the agency of such a mind in the formation of a watch, though it be a formation that we never witnessed. And the same of this world, though we never saw the formation of a world. Our present state gives us to see the posterior term—even all of creation that is visibly before us. Our past history hath not given us the opportunity of seeing the creation itself or of seeing the anterior term, even that agency by which it was effected. But in the course of our experience we have seen adaptations innumerable conjoined with a prior