ing to the statement given by myself in my review of M. Quetelet's work on Probabilities,* to run as follows:—In the gold (out of 500 hits), 107; in the red annulus, 106; in the blue, 101; in the black, 97; and in the white, 89; supposing the target (terminating with the white) to receive half the entire number (1000) of arrows discharged; which in the case observed was not far from the truth. Whereas by the actual record of that day's shooting, handed to me afterwards, the proportional numbers corresponding to a total of 500 hits were:—Gold, 31; red, 89; blue, 121; black, 140; white, 119. This discordance with observation, being far too great to be attributable to ordinary casualty (the whole number of arrows discharged on the day in question being upwards of 7000), led me, of course, to re-examine the reasoning on which the first expectation had been grounded. And so enlightened, I was at no loss to discover its fallacy,—affording, as it does, a good example of the necessity of close attention to the wording of all reasonings on questions of probability. It was, in fact, traceable to the wording of a proposition perfectly true, and, as applied to the case where it was employed in another inquiry, correctly applicable, viz.,†
"Suppose a ball dropped from a given height, with the intention that it shall fall on a given mark. Fall as it may, its deviation from the mark *is error;* and the probability of that error . . . . decreases in geometrical

* Essays from the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews, &c., &c. Longman, 1857. P. 401.
† Essays, &c., &c. Pp. 398, 399.