themselves have made. The principle is at once so obvious and fundamental, that there is scarce a writer on civil liberty who has not laid it down as his very basis. And it would certainly be no easy matter to conceive of aught in more direct and hostile antagonism to such a proposition, than the proposition that a people should be governed, not by laws of their own making, but by the *legislative* decisions of some fifteen irresponsible Judges, chosen by the monarch to "have perpetuall power," and " whose arbitriements should stand for lawe."

Such were some of the grounds of Buchanan's judgment on the " Colledge of Judges ;" and they serve to demonstrate the peculiar sagacity of the man,—a sagacity altogether wonderful when we take into account the early period in which he flourished. His reflection on the barbarous torments to which the assassins of James I. were subjected has been instanced by Dugald Stewart, in his " Dissertation on the Rise of Metaphysical Science," as fraught with philosophy of a deeper reach than can be found in the works of any other writer of so early a period. We would place over against it,—as scarce less vivaciously instinct with the philosophic spirit, and as even a still better example of that discriminating ability in the political field which enabled him to take his place as an asserter of the just principles of civil liberty so mightily in advance of his age,—his remark on the constitution of the Court of Session. It serves at once to remind us of the eulogium of Sir James Macintosh, and to justify it. " The science which teaches the rights of man," says this elegant and powerful writer, " the eloquence which kindles the spirit of freedom, had for ages been buried with the other monuments of the wisdom and relics of the genius of antiquity. But the revival of letters first unlocked only to a few the sacred fountain. The necessary labours of criticism and lexicography occupied the earlier scholars, and some time elapsed