hands of the heritors. How very striking an illustration of the sagacity of Buchanan!

We need scarce refer to the still more striking illustration which our present ecclesiastical struggle furnishes,—an illustration which, we have said, will scarce fail of being appreciated over the whole empire by and by. We shall venture, however, on one remark. It is not according to the nature of things that the decisions of the Court of Session should traverse statutory enactments, which have originated amid the ebullitions of strong popular feeling, and are in reality embodiments of the popular will, so long as these enactments are recent, and the impulse to which they owed their existence is still predominant in the country as a moving power. Nothing less probable, for instance, than that the Court should have reversed any of the more broad and obvious provisions of the Reform Bill when Earl Grey's Ministry were still in office, or any of the more thoroughly understood clauses of the Roman Catholic Emancipation Act ere it had attained to a twelvemonth's standing. The state of these measures as *recent*,—as measures which had agitated the whole country,—whose meanings all the people understood, not so much in their character as statutes, as in their character as embodiments of either their own will or the will of the Roman Catholics of Ireland,—would have prevented most effectually any judicial reversal of the main principles which they involved. The Court of Session might as safely declare that Ernest of Hanover, not Victoria, is the monarch of these realms, as that ten-pound freeholders have no legal right to vote in the election of Members of Parliament, or that at least ten-pound freeholders have no legal right to vote in the election of Members of Parliament who are Roman Catholics. The character of such acts, as recent, restricts our Judges to the exercise of their purely judicial functions. They cannot, they dare not, reverse them. Taking this obvious principle