

*between cause and effect*—that is, the monistic causal connection between all members and parts of the universe—is further shown, among others, by the following remarks in his *Biology*: “The living individual is dependent upon the species, the species upon the fauna, the fauna upon the whole of animate nature, and the latter upon the organism of the earth. The individual possesses indeed a peculiar life, and so far forms its own world. But just because its life is limited it constitutes at the same time an organ in the general organism. Every living body exists in consequence of the universe, but the universe, on the other hand, exists in consequence of it.”

It is self-evident that so profound and clear a thinker as Treviranus, in accordance with this grand mechanical conception of the universe, could not admit for man a privileged and exceptional position in nature, but assumed his gradual development from lower animal forms. And it is equally self-evident, on the other hand, that he did not admit a chasm between organic and inorganic nature, but maintained the absolute unity of the organization of the whole universe. This is specially attested by the following sentence: “Every inquiry into the influence of the whole of nature on the living world must start from the principle that all living forms are products of physical influences, which are acting even now, and are changed only in degree, or in their direction.” Hereby, as Treviranus himself says, “the fundamental problem of biology is solved,” and we add, solved in a purely mechanical or monistic sense.

Yet neither Treviranus nor Goethe is commonly considered the most eminent of the German nature-philosophers. This honour was reserved for Lorenz Oken, who, in estab-