

ideas of young Kant were at a subsequent period wholly suppressed by the overwhelming influence of the dualistic, Christian conception of the universe. In Kant's later works, in place of his earlier ideas, we have either utterly untenable dualistic conceptions, or an indefinite wavering between the former and the latter ideas.

When we read Kant's Criticism of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment, his most important biological work, we perceive that in contemplating organic nature he always maintains what is essentially the teleological or dualistic point of view; whilst for inorganic nature he, unconditionally and without reserve, assumes the mechanical or monistic method of explanation. He affirms that in the domain of inorganic nature all the phenomena can be explained by mechanical causes, by the moving forces of matter itself, but not so in the domain of organic nature. In the whole of Anorganology (in Geology and Mineralogy, in Meteorology and Astronomy, in the physics and chemistry of inorganic natural bodies), all phenomena are said to be explicable merely by *mechanism* (*causa efficiens*), without the intervention of a final purpose. In the whole domain of Biology, on the other hand—in Botany, Zoology, and Anthropology—mechanism is not considered sufficient to explain to us all their phenomena; we are supposed to be able to comprehend them only by an assumption of a *final cause* acting for a definite purpose (*causa finalis*). In several passages Kant emphatically remarks that, from a strictly scientific point of view, *all* phenomena, without exception, require a mechanical interpretation, and that *mechanism alone can offer a true explanation*. But at the same time he thinks, that in regard to living natural bodies, animals and plants, our human