

and the inorganic are not so widely separated as matter and mind ; and that the elements of our experience are in the last resort, not one, but *two*. " Mental and bodily states are utterly contrasted ; and our mental experience, our feelings and thoughts, have *no extension*, no place, no form or outline, no mechanical division of parts, and we are incapable of attending to any thing mental until we shut off the view of all that " (BAIN, PROFESSOR ALEX., *Mind and Body*, pp. 124, 135).

You must not suppose that Bain is witless enough not to recognize the distinction between mind and matter as the broadest known to man. His work on " Mind and Body " I hold in my hand ; and it is one number of those royal and very disappointing roads to knowledge, called " The International Scientific Series." I reverence Professor Bain. He has written some books which are thorough, and will bear, in most parts, the logical microscope. But this volume on " Mind and Body " seems to have been made to order and in haste. Nevertheless, it is the Bible of the latest English materialism ; and now, out of this freshest revelation, let me read a text or two.

" EXTENSION," says Professor Bain, " is but the first of a long series of properties *all present in matter, all absent in mind*. INERTIA cannot belong to a pleasure, a pain, an idea, as experienced in the consciousness. Inertia is accompanied with GRAVITY, a peculiarly material quality. So COLOR is a truly material property : it cannot attach to a feeling, properly so called, a pleasure or a pain. These three properties