

genetic view of nature, drawing likewise into this circle of ideas the great departments of anthropology and geography; in fact, it amounts to rewriting the 'Kosmos' of Humboldt on genetic instead of on purely descriptive lines. But in perusing these and similar writings of modern times, we feel on the one side that we are gradually getting out of the depths of science, not only into the domain of conjecture, without which a knowledge of the past cannot be gained, but also into the regions of philosophical thought, which proceeds on other lines than those prescribed to science, and which will claim our attention in a special portion of this work. On the other side, in using so confidently the ideas of descent and adaptation, we feel that we are appealing to two great empirical facts, the facts of heredity and of variation of living things, on which the genetic view of nature, when applied to the living portion of creation, rests, but which are scarcely even defined in clear terms, much less explained. In fact, we are face to face with the problem and definition of life itself. Neither the morphological nor the genetic view of nature is limited to the living world, although both views originated there, and were from thence extended to the larger domain of inorganic and cosmical phenomena. Into these larger views which try to grasp the forms of nature in their apparent rest or in their endless change and history, the phenomena of life have been fitted by the help of three definite conceptions — the conception of the cell as the morphological basis or unit of all life, and the two conceptions of inheritance and variation, by which living

46.  
Philosophical problems.

47.  
Problem of life.