

view of Nature." Clearly both the morphological and the genetic views of nature remain incomplete unless they embrace the forms and the processes of life. It is the problem from which both started and to which both lead. They, as it were, presuppose its possible solution. Let us see what has been done in the course of our century to effect it.

Before we do this it is well to draw attention to the great strengthening which the genetic or developmental view of nature has received, since the time of Darwin, from other quarters — notably from that of general physics and chemistry in their application to geology and astrophysics.¹

and medicine during the last hundred years has come from that quarter. This large class of studies can be carried on without facing the problem of life at all; and thus it happens that we may have a very large biological literature in which the word life hardly occurs, and in which we seek in vain for a definition of life. We must, therefore, have a term which singles out from the enormous mass of biological literature that smaller portion which professedly deals with those properties and phenomena which are peculiar to the living as distinguished from the lifeless creation. I have chosen for this purpose the term vitalistic; but I may note that in using it I do not limit myself to that class of thinkers who are usually termed "Vitalists," because they are led to, or start with the assumption of, a special vital principle. Even those who, in studying the phenomena of life, arrive at or start from the denial of such a principle are included under the vitalistic view, just as Kant is rightly termed a metaphysician

although the outcome of his philosophy may be considered to be the destruction of metaphysics in the sense which was current in his age.

¹ A general scheme of evolution, or of development as it was more frequently termed, which would embrace equally cosmical and terrestrial processes, the lifeless and living world, was clearly before the mind of Schelling and his followers, notably Oken and Steffens. The vagueness and extravagancies of this school brought the idea into discredit, and the remedy applied by Hegel, to put a logical process in the place of fantastic suggestions, ruined it utterly in the eyes of the cultivators of exact research. Only very few of the great students of organic development, but among them the greatest, von Baer, retained a just appreciation of the great aims of Schelling. The study of development abroad was almost entirely limited to embryology. In other sciences the "statical" aspect ruled supreme. In the face of this somewhat retrograde movement