that the answer which we may give to them is of no scientific importance and of no scientific value. The question, "What is electricity? What is the ether?" cannot yet be answered; nevertheless the sciences which deal with the properties of the ether or of electrical bodies are advancing daily. So also—we are told—does the science of biology progress, even though we leave the question "What is life?" unanswered. This would be a tenable position if the living organism were like an electrical or an optical apparatus, constructed by man himself with the modicum of knowledge which he possesses. But the living organism, the eye that can see or the nervous system that is in action, or even the smallest "autonomous" cell, visible only with the microscope, are each an apparatus constructed by nature with the employment of all the intricate agencies which are at her command. In dealing with such an apparatus, we are again and again tempted to ask, "What is life? On what does the normal and healthy co-operation of all parts in the living organism depend? In what does it consist?" Fragmentary knowledge may be well enough so far as it goes, but every medical practitioner must painfully feel it to be altogether insufficient. Where practical interests are involved we cannot indefinitely postpone our answers. Science can wait and

physiques elle ne peut exercer aucune influence sur elles. Il faut donc ici séparer le monde métaphysique du monde physique phénoménal qui lui sert de base, mais qui n'a rien à lui emprunter. . . . En résumé, si nous pouvons définir la vie à l'aide d'une conception métaphysique spéciale, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que les forces mécaniques, physiques, et chimiques, sont seules les agents effectifs de l'organisme vivant, et que la physiologiste ne peut avoir à tenir compte que de leur action. Nous dirons avec Descartes: on pense métaphysiquement, mais on vit et on agit physiquement."