naturalist may neglect it, or at best can only use it as an "heuristic" help, as an indication where to look for the special mechanical contrivances which he is trying to unravel. It seems to me that the position which such thinkers take up towards the objects or individuals of living nature is similar to that of a mathematical student who clearly comprehends the solution of an algebraical problem, but who himself would be unable to find it. He may all his life remain in this attitude without being able to find any solution himself: he has got complete hold of the mechanism, but not of the idea, of mathematical reasoning. The student of nature could thus hope eventually to understand the mechanism of life, but the idea is beyond his comprehension. This can be expressed by saying: the mechanism of life is ultimately comprehensible, though highly intricate; the idea of life is transcendental, incomprehensible. Let us not trouble ourselves about the manner in which life first originated, but let us study the mechanical processes by which it is maintained, by which its various ends are accomplished. Let us study the mechanism of the clock, though this may not tell us the story of its maker nor the process of its manufacture. Those who cling to the conception of a vital force or principle would probably not even admit as much as this. It is doubtful whether Liebig to the end, whether Huxley in his earlier period, and Du Bois-Reymond in his later writings, would have admitted even this position.

26. Darwinism and final causes.

We are now prepared to understand the novel position which the Darwinian conception of natural processes introduced so far as the teleology of nature is concerned,