

ticians,¹ as Hobbes had been before him, Berkeley had a clear conception of the following definite problem: By what succession of physical and mental experiences, by what "organic and vital data," do we become aware of space and of body or matter? His answer, which makes tactile sensations the base, has been advocated and quoted by English psychologists of the Association school up to the present day, and forms the text for their various explanations.

The genesis of space perception was much discussed in the circle of Locke's friends, Molyneux proposing the celebrated query² named after him, and Cheselden describing at length, in the *Philosophical Transactions*, the experiences of an adult blind patient who had received his sight by couching. The eighteenth century brought other isolated researches of an experimental or mathematical nature, which may be regarded as the beginnings of an exact treatment of the relation of psy-

ing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, such as to recreate and exalt the mind," &c. In the following paragraph Berkeley refers to the 'Principia' as "the best grammar of the kind" he was speaking of.

¹ A very full account of this controversy will be found in a paper by Prof. Geo. A. Gibson in the 'Proceedings of the Edin. Math. Soc.,' vol. xvii.

² The query is given in Locke's 'Essay,' Book II. ch. ix. § 8, as follows: "Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell when he felt

one and the other, which is the cube and which the sphere. Suppose, then, the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man made to see: Query, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which is the cube? To which the acute and judicious proposer answers, No." For a full analysis of actual cases, such as that of Cheselden, and more recent ones, see Wundt, 'Physiologische Psychologie,' vol. ii. p. 233. That Berkeley was, however, neither a psycho-physicist nor a physiological psychologist in the modern sense, is well remarked by Campbell Fraser in his essay on Berkeley (Blackwood's "Philos. Classics," 'Berkeley,' p. 45, &c.)