

Wundt differs quite as much from Lotze, who also strove to arrive at a view of the totality of human life and its significance. Lotze belonged, in spite of the original and independent view which he took of the psycho-physical problem, to the older school of philosophers. Wundt belongs quite to the modern school.¹ Fechner forms the transition. Lotze begins his psychology, and even his physiology of the soul, with a lengthy dissertation on the unity of the soul as a special being, just as Herbart begins his psychology with metaphysics. This metaphysical introduction, these definitions relating to the essence of the soul, its unity, and its location, are absent in the modern psychology. Instead of founding psychology on experience, metaphysics, and mathematics, Wundt founds it on experience (including experiment), physiology, and mathematics. In consequence of this altered foundation a new problem has arisen, precisely as a new problem arose for biologists when they discarded vital force as a meaningless and useless encumbrance. For the older biologists life was the exhibition

83.
Wundt,
Fechner,
and Lotze
compared.

¹ See the preface to the second edition of the 'System der Philosophie' (Leipzig, 1897), p. ix: "I have always tried to co-operate in the endeavour to secure for psychology an independent position as an empirical science outside of philosophy, and to see that she should not lack the support of the scientific method in so far as this could be transferred to her. . . . As I started from natural science and then came to philosophy through occupation with empirical psychology, it would have appeared to me impossible to philosophise in any other way than in correspondence with this sequence of

the problems. But I quite well understand that the position may be different for him who begins with philosophy and then makes occasional excursions into the regions of science or psychology." Compare with this what Lotze says in the Introduction to his 'Streit-schriften' (1857), or the following passage from one of his last essays ('Contemp. Rev.,' January 1880), "Except in rare cases, a prolonged philosophical labour is nothing else but the attempt to justify, scientifically, a fundamental view of things which has been adopted in early life."