

of eminence, Huxley and Clifford,¹ have made the theory accessible to the popular understanding, without, however, taking a comprehensive view of the study of mental phenomena, inasmuch as they approached the subject from the side of natural science—the former more from that of physiology, the latter from that of the mechanical sciences. Prof. Wundt treats the subject exhaustively in many passages of his works, notably in the last chapter of his great work on ‘Physiological Psychology,’ in which he broadly defines “the psycho-physical view as that view which starts from the empirically well-established thesis, that nothing takes place in our consciousness which does not find its foundation in definite physical processes. The simple sensation, the connection

¹ Although neither Huxley nor Clifford added anything new to the conception of parallelism as contained in the writings of many earlier Continental philosophers, the fact that they were driven from their purely scientific positions to discuss the subject, and were not psychologists and metaphysicians by profession, gave their expositions, which are otherwise as fresh as they are immature, a peculiar charm. Being both masters in style, they at once enriched the vocabulary with new terms which have since become classic. The word “epi-phenomenon,” an equivalent for the German ‘Begleiterscheinung,’ which is of independent origin but expresses Huxley’s view, is a real enrichment of thought. It is also the direct way to bring home the absurdity of the whole theory. The things of nature being first considered as “phenomena”—*i.e.*, as “appearing” to some one,—the some one is next looked upon as a secondary phenomenon, an epi-

phenomenon. Clifford actually in his psychological atomism goes the length of saying, “Reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex which is made up of elements, themselves not rational, not intelligent, not conscious” (see ‘Mind,’ vol. iii. p. 67). In the physical theory of atoms it has been truly said that you cannot get anything out of the atoms that you have not, to begin with, put into them. Clifford’s dictum reminds one of Carlyle’s definition of the object of political economy, which has to solve the problem, “Given a community consisting of fools and knaves, how to produce efficiency and honesty by their combined action?” Clifford’s solution of the psychological deadlock is the “Mind-stuff” theory, the theory that all matter is the phenomenal correlate of the elements of mind. Clifford’s essay “On the Nature of Things in themselves” is reprinted in ‘Lectures and Essays’ (1879), vol. ii. p. 71 *sqq.*