forces that hem her in, resolve themselves at last into her overthrow. There is little of the grand style about these new prism, pendulum, and chronograph philosophers. They mean business, not chivalry. What generous divination and that superiority in virtue which was thought by Cicero to give a man the best insight into nature have failed to do, their spying and scraping, their deadly tenacity and almost diabolical cunning, will doubtless some day bring about. . . The experimental method has quite changed the face of the science, so far as the latter is a record of the mere work done."

It is, however, only fair to remark that it has never been the object of any science, and can, therefore, no more be the object of exact psychology, to deal with everything at once, and that psycho-physical science has quite as much right to postpone the question, What is mind?¹ as biological science has had to postpone, or even to eliminate, the question, What is life? But this comparison reveals also the essential difference between the exact science of life and the exact science of mind. Of life we know only through the observation of living beings, but of mind we have not only the apparent knowledge of its unity, which introspection forces upon

¹ "Sensation, Retentiveness, Association by Contiguity,—these are to be our ultimate and sufficient psychological conceptions: the facts of feeling and conation are resolved into facts of sensation; and all mind-processes held to be not merely conditioned, but explained by brain-processes, which they accompany as epi-phenomena or 'Begleit-erscheinungen.' It is not so long since the world was shocked at Lange's mot about a psychology without a soul, but the 'modern' psychology is a psychology without even consciousness. 'Content of consciousness 'as much as you like, but consciousness itself, consciousness as activity, is not our affair; we leave that to metaphysics, say our 'modern' teachers." (Prof. J. Ward, on "Modern Psychology," 'Mind,' 2nd series, vol. ii. p. 55).