

Emotions in Man and Animals' a year after. These writings did more than any others to impress upon philosophers the genetic or historical view, the existence of an unbroken chain or transition from the lower to the higher and the highest forms of animal structures, and culminated in the well-known expression of Darwin, that "in a series of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix at any definite point when the term 'man' ought to be used."¹ This dictum has been the theme on which endless variations have been played down to the present day—Prof. Ernest Haeckel's address to the Congress of Zoology at Cambridge in 1898 being the latest summary of the physical aspect of the problem. But the problem has also a psycho-physical side, and this aspect is concentrated in the problem of language. Even those philologists who, like August Schleicher and Max Müller, look upon the science of language as a natural science, bring in at this point the accumulated and weighty evidence of the historical, psychological, and philosophical researches into the growth and development of human speech and human thought, as absolutely negating the possibility of a gradual transition from the brute to the human creation. To the latter, language, which he considers to be the union of definite concepts with definite names, is the Rubicon which cannot be crossed,² the chasm which divides that portion of the

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The dividing
line between
man and
brute.

¹ 'Descent of Man,' 1st ed., vol. i. p. 235.

² See Max Müller, 'The Science of Thought,' *passim*, notably chap. iv. p. 177, where he quotes and maintains his dictum of 1861 ('Lec-

tures on the Science of Language,' vol. i. p. 403): "Language is our Rubicon, and no brute will dare to cross it." Referring to Schleicher, he says (p. 164): "Professor Schleicher, though an enthusiastic