

port of one of his favourite theses — viz., that the course of historical progress depends on the combined action of the external physical surroundings and of the intellectual side of human nature. Apart from intellectual modifications the moral side is a constant. In the course of the discussions following the appearance of Buckle's History, especially in Germany, it was conclusively shown that statistical figures prove neither one view nor the other: indeed, one of the most complete and exhaustive treatises on moral statistics comes from the orthodox pen of Alexander von Oettingen, a Professor of Theology, just as we saw that the first great work on political arithmetic in Germany came from the pastor Süssmilch a century earlier. Philosophical writers like Lotze¹

not received the attention merited: "This reproach does not quite hit the right point. . . . Wagner might, in fact, have been led by Buckle . . . to see that German philosophy in the doctrine of the freedom of the will has for once an advantage which permits it to regard these new studies with equanimity; for Buckle supports himself above all upon Kant, adducing his testimony for the empirical necessity of human actions, and leaving aside the transcendental theory of freedom. Although all that materialism can draw from moral statistics . . . for the practical value of a materialistic tendency of the age as against idealism has thus been conceded by Kant, it is by no means indifferent whether moral statistics, and, as we may put it, the whole of statistics, is placed in the foreground of anthropological study or not; for moral statistics direct the view outwards upon the real measurable

facts of life, while the German philosophy, despite its clearness as to the nullity of the old doctrine of freewill, still always prefers to direct its view inwards upon the facts of consciousness."

¹ Lotze's deliverances on this subject will be found in the third chapter of the seventh book of the 'Microcosmus' (Eng. trans. by Hamilton and Jones, vol. ii. p. 200, &c.), and also in the 'Logik' of 1874 (Book II. chap. 8). In the former passage he says: "The dislike with which we hear of laws of psychic life, whilst we do not hesitate to regard bodily life as subordinate to its own laws, arises partly because we require too much from our own freedom of will, partly because we let ourselves be too much imposed upon by those laws. If we do not find ourselves involved in the declared struggle between freedom and necessity, we are by no means averse to regarding the actions of