which science is obliged to make being the inevitable one that Nature is intelligible to the human mind, which is the same as saying that we must assume the existence of some kind of Order.

There exists, indeed, in the human mind a further demand, which may be defined by saying that the conception of order in Nature or of its intelligibility should not be held merely as a formal iteration, but should be expressed as a highest Unity by some term which conveys to our minds something more than the idea of an empty From this demand there have further arisen at form. all times various attempts to give expression to the ideas of unity, of simplicity, and of the significance of the whole scheme of existence which we call Nature. Such attempts do not form part of purely scientific thought. They are speculations for which those principles of science that are capable of exact enunciation do not suffice. They have, indeed, frequently appeared in the literature of the nineteenth century. But although there are isolated cases where scientific authorities of the first order have indulged in them, such authorities have, as a rule, shown an increasing reluctance to deal with fundamental questions or with principles which extend beyond the limits of scientific thought. We have no examples in the nineteenth century of such intellects as those of Leibniz or Newton. However different these two great thinkers of an earlier age may have been, they had this in common, that for them the scientific and the religious aspects were not only equally important, but equally occupied their attention. The characteristic difference was that Leibniz apparently strove after a

1. Order and Unity.