banishing them from the scientific vocabulary. Such conceptions have always crept in again, proving that they are indispensable even to the purely scientific comprehension or description of natural objects, or of nature as a whole.

It is not surprising, therefore, that an independent examination of the ultimate conceptions which science makes use of, or which it evolves, should have been a task which has occupied some of the greatest intellects of our period, and that the problem arising from this should form a fitting transition from the purely scientific to the philosophical portion of this history.

Now, if we try to characterise in the briefest possible manner the general problems which scientific thought as a whole has definitely formulated and placed before the philosophical thinker, there are two words which stand out prominently as indicating the two grand and complementary conceptions which either underlie all scientific inquiry or result from it. The first of these has already been stated. We saw that exact or scientific thought assumes that there exists in Nature an intelligible ORDER. The closer definition of this order in the so-called laws of the cosmos has to be ascertained by experience, and has been the subject of the foregoing narrative. The subject which remains for philosophical discussion is not any special form of order, but the fact that any kind of order exists at all, and that it is accessible to the human intellect. Clearly this is a question which affects Nature, the object, as much as the human Intellect, the subject.

But if the idea of Order underlies all scientific thought,