

history of German culture unrolls before our view. Thus the powers of the human mind, which in the various writings of Kant seem to co-operate in producing the intellectual, moral, and spiritual life of the human soul, are characteristically represented in the systems of his followers, not only by being emphasised as leading principles; they are supported also in many instances by the personal character of the authors of those systems. For instance, if we read in Kant of the primacy of the will over the intellect, no more practical instance could be found wherewith to demonstrate this power of the human will than the life and the personality of Fichte. But it is not my intention to enlarge further on this point or to indulge in fanciful analogies. I desire only to arouse in my readers some sense of the wider psychological problem which the history of German idealism presents in its various aspects as philosophical, classical, or romantic, and in its appearance in science, poetry, and art.¹

¹ Referring again to what was said in the note to page 65, we may look upon Hegel's first great work as the psychology of the universal or absolute mind, and upon his later logic as the stages and method of its development. Earlier writings of Hegel were preparatory to his final exposition, and had the object of defining the difference of his speculation from earlier attempts. This has been well brought out by Kuno Fischer in his brilliant analysis of Hegel's earlier tracts, in the last section of his 'History of Modern Philosophy' (vol. viii. p. 245 sqq.) Still earlier preparative studies are dealt with by Dilthey in the dissertation quoted in the last note. Hegel defends the new

philosophy, which was to "lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge." As against the fragmentary philosophy of the "Aufklärung" the new philosophy was to be systematic; as against the philosophy of common-sense, represented in Germany by Krug, the new philosophy was not to be content with enumerating empirically the data of consciousness,—it had, following Kant, to deduce them from a higher principle; as against modern sceptics, represented in Germany by G. E. Schulze, it had to overcome the agnosticism suggested in Kant's mistaken doctrine of "the Thing in itself" as opposed to its appearance; as against the distinction of know-