

had been; he is never impolite as Fichte and Schelling frequently were; nor does he fasten upon his opponents any stigma as Hegel frequently succeeded in doing;¹ he is quite above that virulent and unmannerly invective by which Schopenhauer tries to crush, but actually never damages, the arguments of thinkers whom he chooses to regard as enemies. But the style of Lotze reflects one characteristic trait of modern thought. The confidence and self-assurance of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and of the earlier Schelling have disappeared. It is the style of a period of transition and uncertainty; much of the light which the preceding age thought it possessed has vanished and the new light has not yet dawned.²

¹ The ill-disguised contempt with which Hegel treats contemporary thinkers of eminence, such as Jacobi, Fichte, and Schleiermacher, in his contributions to the 'Critical Journal,' is less objectionable, though probably more effective, than the unpardonable rudeness with which Schelling treated some of his opponents and even friends, such as Jacobi, Eschenmayer, and Windischmann (see 'Aus Schelling's Leben').

But lasting harm was done to the cause of philosophy by the antagonism which existed between Schleiermacher and Hegel. The frequently quoted criticism in which Hegel, in mature years (1822), attacked Schleiermacher's conception of religion, as arising out of a feeling of absolute dependence which would put it on the level of "the feelings of a dog," was never forgiven by Schleiermacher. It appears that he prevented Hegel's election as a member of the Berlin Academy, and, on the other side, Hegel threatened to leave Berlin if the proposition to secure Schleiermacher's co-operation in an in-

tended philosophical Review was persisted in: the result being that this Review ('Jahrbücher für Wissenschaftliche Kritik,' 1827) did not include, in the list of its celebrated patrons, the important name of Schleiermacher, and was subsequently regarded as an exclusive organ of the Hegelian party (see Kuno Fischer, 'Hegel, &c.,' vol. i. p. 180).

² With Lotze as with all of the best of recent thought the labour and search seem to be much greater than the achievement; the criticism quite out of proportion to the result. The latter consists frequently merely in indications, in suggestions, or in conclusions which are intentionally termed subjective; in fact, Lotze seems to draw a sharp line between knowledge and conviction, and we are reminded of a dictum of David Hume that arguments may be logically unanswerable and yet carry no conviction. In this there is involved a psychological problem which no line of thought has done more to force upon the present age than that initiated by Lotze.