

thinkers—Lotze a generation earlier than Sidgwick—recognised the necessity of a minute investigation of the existing and frequently conflicting trains of reasoning supplied by different schools of thought as well as by common-sense. Both thinkers, though not sceptics in the current sense of the term, were sceptical in so far as they entertained but small faith in the capacities of the human mind to solve the fundamental philosophical problem as this presented itself to them.<sup>1</sup> Both attached much value to faithfulness in detail and to appreciative criticism: both also agreed in this, that they opposed the exaggerated pretensions of the historical and critical schools of philosophy; that to them an account of the history, genesis or origin of existing notions, even if it could be correctly given, furnished no clue for deciding the correctness or otherwise of such notions; for in fact statements of being and becoming cannot furnish reasons for that which ought to be. Lotze on his side, as we have seen, found the key to the understanding of what is and has been, in that which ought to be; whereas Sidgwick maintains that it is quite illegitimate to infer that a moral judgment is valid because it exists, because it is original or innate in the individual, or to discredit it because it is evolved. Thus he maintained that we cannot get behind our ultimate intuitions; something among these must be accepted though unproved. From their respective positions both thinkers likewise object to the main drift of the critical philosophy—viz., that before starting to reason, the

<sup>1</sup> "On the whole I harbour only very modest expectations as to the power of human thought to solve these problems completely" (Lotze, 'Streitschriften,' 1857, p. 58).