

his philosophy of history. He expressly remarks that when elaborating his own scheme he purposely abstained from reading other philosophies of history such as those of Vico, Kant, Herder, and Hegel. Unlike von Hartmann, who spent the latter part of his life in studying and explaining the relation in which his own philosophy stood to other systems, Comte does not seem to have carefully studied any other philosophy. His historical sense did not prompt him to exhibit in detail his own speculation as the latest result of other and earlier courses of thought. In this way he is different from Schopenhauer, who distinctly attaches the fundamental conception in his speculations to the history of a definite philosophical problem which was brought out, but not solved, by Kant. Comte anticipates a complete reorganisation of thought and society as a result of his doctrine. In this respect he resembles both Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, especially the latter, who, however, differs from him inasmuch as he does not look for any sudden effect and acceptance of his teaching: whereas Comte, during the later years of his life, lived in this respect under a great illusion.

The philosophy of Comte leads us by an easy step to that of Herbert Spencer. The two thinkers are in popular literature frequently classed together: Spencer is sometimes considered to be a Positivist, and Comte an Evolutionist. Spencer himself objects to being placed in the same category with Comte, and Comte, though making free use of the term "evolution," did not really enter into the spirit of the doctrine in its modern form. The two doctrines however can be, to a large extent,

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Herbert  
Spencer.