

In such speculations the properties of matter and the process of cosmic evolution have no place.¹ Bergson, indeed, very definitely, and it would seem gratuitously, puts aside cosmic evolution and also, with certain slight reservations, the properties of matter as of no essential consequence in organic evolution; *e.g.* "This twofold result has been obtained in a particular way on our planet. But it might have been obtained by entirely different means. It was not necessary that life should fix its choice mainly upon the carbon of carbonic acid. What was essential for it was to store solar energy; but, instead of asking the sun to separate, for instance, atoms of oxygen and carbon, it might (theoretically at least, and, apart from practical difficulties

¹ Driesch, to be sure, has considered the problem of universal teleology, but unsuccessfully and with obvious vitalistic preconceptions such as *individuality*. His nearest approach to the thesis of the present work is to be found in the following lines: "I do not hesitate to confess that, apart from historical teleology relating to the sequence of one state of politics or economy upon another, and apart from phylogeny, there seems to me to be a certain sound foundation in the concept of the general harmony between organic and inorganic nature, a something which seems to show *that nature is nature for a certain purpose*. But I confess at the same time that I am absolutely unable to consider this purpose in any other than a purely anthropomorphic manner." — *L.c.*, Vol. II, pp. 348-349.