

anistic process, and it must not be itself liable to any kind of variation whose detection would directly reveal it. Where then can the origin of such a tendency be located? Why clearly, if we accept the induction in favor of mechanism, only where Bergson has shrewdly placed his vital impetus, at the very origin of things, just before mechanism begins to act. In short, our new teleology cannot have originated in or through mechanism, but it is a necessary and preëstablished associate of mechanism. Matter and energy have an original property, assuredly not by chance, which organizes the universe in space and time.

This is in very truth a metaphysical doctrine; but it has strong claims to sympathetic regard from men of science. In the first place, it leaves mechanism with the perfectly free hand which that process has undoubtedly earned in the world of phenomena. Secondly, it does but add one further riddle, and that an old and familiar one, to those two already tacitly recognized by most scientists: the existence of the universe and the existence of life. Given the universe, life, and the tendency, mechanism is inductively proved sufficient to account for all phenomena.

The existence of the universe, on the other