ferred, that it is really a tangible, in other words a material substance. "Thus," he says, "when "we observe that the winds, which are evidently "nothing more than currents of air, not only " drive the clouds in various directions, but vio-" lently agitate the ocean; and even occasion "the wreck of the largest ships, by dashing " them against the rocks: or when, in the form " of a hurricane, they snap asunder the state-"liest oaks, and lay prostrate in their course " the honours of the mountain forest; we can-" not doubt that in their mode of action, as well " as in the destructive character of their effects, " they resemble the inundation of a rapid river; " like which, they sweep before them every ob-" stacle, or carry up the heaviest bodies into " the atmosphere, in their invisible eddies, with " no less ease than the eddies of a rapid stream " ingulf whatever comes within their vortex<sup>i</sup>." He also shews, by a still more refined argument, that the air must be a material substance. because it offers resistance to falling bodies; proving this resistance by the difference in the velocity of falling bodies of different weights: for, were there no resistance in the air, he asserts, and the fact is experimentally shewn in modern lectures, that unequal weights, meeting with no impediment or support, would fall with equal velocity<sup>k</sup>.