we have ourselves experienced that we ascribe similar feelings to other sentient beings, and that we infer their existence from the phenomena which they present. Wherever these indications of feeling are most distinct, we find that they result from a particular organization, and from the affections of a peculiar part of that organization denominated the *nervous substance*. The name of *brain* is given to a particular mass of this substance placed in the interior of the body, where it is carefully protected from injury.

The sensations, for exciting which the brain is the material instrument, or immediate organ, are the result of certain impressions made on particular parts of the body, and conveyed to that organ by the medium of filaments, composed of a similar substance, and termed nerves. In this way, then, it has been provided that a communication shall be established between the sentient principle and the external objects, by which its activity is to be excited, and on which it is to be dependent for the elements of all its affections, both of sensation and of intellect. A considerable portion of this treatise will be occupied with the development of the series of means by which impressions from external objects are made on the appropriate organs that are provided to receive and collect them, so as not only to give rise to varied sensations, but also to convey a knowledge of the existence and different qualities of the objects which produce them. This latter faculty is termed Perception.

But in the formation of animals it was not the intention of Providence to endow them with the mere capacity of being affected by surrounding objects, and of deriving from them various sensations of pleasure and of pain, without granting them the power of controlling these effects, and of acting on those objects in return. The facultics of sensation and perception, in beings destined to be merely passive, and the sport of every contingent agency, would have been not merely useless, but even baneful endowments. The same beneficent power which has conferred these gifts has conjoined that of voluntary motion, by which the animal may not only obtain possession of such objects as minister to its